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A RIGHT TO DIE, A RIGHT TO INSURANCE PAYOUTS?
THE IMPLICATIONS OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE ON LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS
Amber N. Morris*
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate revolving around assisted death in the United States has
persisted since the early 1900s.1 In 1997, Oregon was the first state in the
Union to codify physician-assisted suicide (“PAS”).2 Since then, eight other
American jurisdictions have followed suit, and sixteen more considered
PAS legislation in 2020.3 As more states enact PAS laws, it is imperative
that the laws include provisions that protect consumers, specifically regard-
ing post-mortem life insurance benefits. This paper is the first to analyze
PAS and its impact on life insurance, taking the stance that beneficiaries of
insureds who participate in PAS should not be denied benefits under the
insurance policy, regardless of contractual language to the contrary.
An individual’s right to privacy and autonomy has developed tremen-
dously over the past half-century in American jurisprudence.4 Some of
these rights revolve around a patient’s freedom to make independent medi-
cal decisions regarding the patient’s care.5 Patient autonomy, however, is
* J.D., The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law; B.S. The Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity. The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and guidance of Professor Christopher C. French,
Professor of Practice at Penn State Law, and his assistance on this paper. Additionally, the author thanks
her friends and family, especially Emily M. LaSpina and Melissa Marie Blanco, for their continuous
support and encouragement throughout the writing process.
1. Chronology of Assisted Dying in the U.S., DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://perma.cc/3T7U-YWYJ
(last visited July 28, 2020).
2. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–127.987 (2020); see also History, DEATH WITH DIGNITY,
https://perma.cc/HRT3-YQDW (last visited July 1, 2020) (“[The passage of Oregon’s Death with Dig-
nity Act] made Oregon the first U.S. state and one of the first jurisdictions in the world to officially
legalize medical aid in dying.”).
3. Take Action in Your State, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://perma.cc/E598-AT23 (last visited Apr.
4, 2020). Jurisdictions that have adopted PAS laws include California, Colorado, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. Id.
4. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut statute
banning the sale of contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends the right to contraception to non-married indi-
viduals); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (ruling women have a constitutional right to privacy regard-
ing abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that individuals have a constitutional right
to marry each other, regardless of race); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that
individuals of the same sex have a constitutional right to marry one another).
5. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding
that an individual has the right to terminate life-saving treatment); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (ruling that a woman need not obtain spousal consent prior to receiving an abortion and
1
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not limitless and may be narrowed when strong public policy concerns
point to restricting the individual rights of the patient.6
A patient’s right to die,7 or lack thereof, is an example of the strong
public policy concerns restricting the individual rights of the patient.8 The
United States Supreme Court has examined the right to die and its relevance
to patient autonomy and the right to privacy on several occasions; however,
the Court has yet to rule that the right to die is a fundamental right.9 None-
theless, nine American jurisdictions have codified right-to-die laws in the
form of PAS statutes, otherwise known as “Death with Dignity” laws.10
PAS occurs when a doctor assists a patient in committing suicide
through the doctor’s medical knowledge or a written prescription.11 Unlike
euthanasia, the doctor does not actively participate in the final act of killing
the patient; rather, the patient commits suicide based on information
gleaned from the doctor or through ingesting a pill from a written prescrip-
tion.12 Statutes legalizing PAS are modeled after Oregon’s Death with Dig-
nity Act, which was the first codified PAS statute in the United States.13
reaffirming the holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (holding that a woman
has a fundamental right to privacy regarding abortion).
6. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that the Con-
stitution does not forbid states from requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent’s wishes
regarding withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
7. The right to die includes three distinct types of assisted death: active euthanasia, passive eutha-
nasia, and PAS. Katherine A. Chamberlain, Looking for a Good Death, 17 ELDER L.J. 61, 65 (2009).
Active euthanasia involves a physician “‘perform[ing] an affirmative act, such as injecting a lethal dose
of opiates into the patient, with the intent of causing the patient’s death.’” Glen R. McMurry, Comment,
An Unconstitutional Death: The Oregon Death with Dignity Act’s Prohibition Against Self-Administered
Lethal Injection, 32 DAYTON L. REV. 441, 449 (2007). Passive euthanasia refers to a time in which a
patient dies due to “a physician’s inaction or omission, such as withholding life-sustaining hydration and
nutrients or refusing to initiate potentially life-threatening therapies.” Id. Lastly, PAS does not require a
doctor’s action or inaction; rather, “the doctor assists suicide by offering her medical knowledge but
does not actively or passively participate in the actual event of death.” See Chamberlain, supra, at 65.
For example, the doctor may provide the means of death, such as a writing a prescription for the patient,
while the patient takes the active step to ingest the prescription, thereby causing death. Id. The focus of
this paper is PAS.
8. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (holding that New York statutes outlawing assisted suicide
do not violate the Equal Protection right of terminally-ill individuals); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that assisting in another person’s suicide is not a fundamental right, and is
therefore not protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
9. See, e.g., Vacco, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006).
10. Take Action in Your State, supra note 3. These jurisdictions include California, Colorado, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Hawaii, New Jersey, Maine, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. Id. Montana has not
codified PAS, but the state’s Supreme Court has held that nothing in Montana law prohibits PAS. See
Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1221 (Mont. 2009).
11. See generally Chamberlain, supra note 7.
12. Id. at 65.
13. Death with Dignity Acts, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://perma.cc/KTH3-BEAK (last visited July
28, 2020).
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Due to the success of Oregon’s PAS legislation, many of the provisions in
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act are included in other PAS legislation
across the country.14
Although Oregon codified the first PAS statute in 1997,15 states con-
tinue to debate PAS legislation across the United States.16 In 2019 alone,
twenty states considered PAS legislation in their respective legislatures,17
and two states adopted right-to-die laws.18 Because of the serious and per-
manent nature of PAS, right-to-die legislation requires stringent safeguards
to protect patients and prevent misuse of the system.19 For example, a per-
son participating in PAS must be diagnosed with a terminal illness,20 de-
fined as “an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically con-
firmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within
six months.”21 Other safeguards exist within PAS statutes that protect the
patient post-mortem, such as provisions regulating insurance and annuity
policies.22
These safeguards require that insurers23 honor an insured’s24 decision
to participate in PAS; thus, an insured’s participation in PAS cannot affect
the applicability of relevant insurance policies.25 Despite these safeguards,
14. Id.
15. Oregon, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://perma.cc/GZ42-PTYZ (last visited July 28, 2020).
16. Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
17. Id. States that considered PAS legislation in 2019 were: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia. Id.
18. Maine and New Jersey adopted PAS legislation during the 2019 legislative session. See From
First Bill to Final Win: A Recap of the 2019 Legislative Session, https://perma.cc/5PJS-X2XN (last
visited July 28, 2020).
19. Chamberlain, supra note 7, at 85.
20. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2020).
21. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2020).
22. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-115
(2020); D.C. CODE § 7-661.009 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-17 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 22
§ 2140(19) (2019); N.J. STAT. § 26:16-14 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.875 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 5287 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.170 (2020).
23. An insurer is “[s]omeone who agrees, by contract, to assume the risk of another’s loss and to
compensate for that loss.” Insurer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
24. An insured is “[s]omeone who is covered or protected by an insurance policy.” Insured,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A policyholder is “[s]omeone who owns an insurance pol-
icy, regardless of whether that person is the insured party.” Policyholder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). Although a policyholder may be an insured under the policy, a policy may also cover a
third party who is not the policyholder. Id.
25. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-115 (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-661.009 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-17 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(19) (2019);
N.J. STAT. § 26:16-14 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.875 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5287 (2020);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.170 (2020).
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the broad statutory language in PAS legislation allows insurers to attempt to
avoid coverage if an insured participates in PAS.26
This paper specifically analyzes PAS and its applicability to incontest-
ability and suicide clauses, insurer defenses, and policyholder counter-de-
fenses. Part II of this paper begins with a history of PAS in the United
States and concludes by explaining life insurance, insurer defenses to cover-
age, and policyholder counter-defenses. Part III of this paper analyzes
whether a life insurance policy should be held in force under three scena-
rios: (1) when the policyholder knew of the terminal illness before applying
for life insurance and disclosed this information to the insurer, (2) when the
policyholder knew of the terminal illness before applying for life insurance
and did not disclose this information to the insurer, and (3) when the policy-
holder did not know about the terminal illness prior to applying for life
insurance, and thus, could not disclose the information to the insurer.
Additionally, Part III of this paper argues that, unless the policyholder
misrepresented information on the application for insurance, an insurer can-
not contest liability under the policy. This paper further argues that PAS
does not constitute “suicide” in the common sense of the word. Persons
participating in PAS are not taking their own lives with an uncertain life
span; rather, they have a specified, limited time to live due to illness and
wish to expediate their impending death through dignified means. Thus,
because insureds participating in PAS will perish in a limited time regard-
less of whether they participate in PAS, beneficiaries of insureds who par-
ticipate in PAS should not be denied benefits under the policy, despite con-
tractual language to the contrary under a suicide clause.
Part IV of this paper analyzes the impact of legislation when states
adopt right-to-die laws and how this the legislation affects life insurance
benefits post-mortem. With the rise of PAS legislation, it is imperative that
states adopting these laws codify specific provisions that require insurers to
honor an insured’s decision to participate in PAS, regardless of policy lan-
guage to the contrary. Failure to include safeguards regulating insurers in
PAS laws will lead to prejudicial treatment of insureds that participate in
PAS and will unjustly strip beneficiaries of their rightful compensation
under the policy.
Lastly, Part V of this paper recommends amendments to existing PAS
laws, which should be incorporated in future PAS legislation. These amend-
ments include specific and unambiguous language requiring insurers to
honor an insured’s decision to participate in PAS, regardless of policy lan-
26. See generally CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH & ROBERT H. JERRY, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND EXERCISES at 64 (2018) (“The practice of some insurers of going back to the
application and attempting to find some basis for voiding a policy . . . is not an unusual practice, as
insurers typically use every means at their disposal to deny claims to the extent legally permissible.”).
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guage to the contrary. The recommended amendments will further protect
vulnerable consumers from prejudicial treatment post-mortem.
II. BACKGROUND
The effect of PAS on life insurance benefits addresses two complex
areas of law: constitutional rights to privacy and autonomy, and insurance
regulation. Given the intricacies of these areas of law this paper first thor-
oughly examines the history and background of each prior to an analysis of
the overlap between them.
A. Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States
The right to die has been a contested topic in American jurisprudence
for over a century.27 The stigma against suicide in Great Britain carried
over to the American colonies and situated itself in the common law.28 In
1828, New York became the first state to explicitly outlaw assisted suicide,
with many states following suit.29 By the time Congress ratified the Four-
teenth Amendment, most states prohibited assisted suicide, reasoning that
the state has a legitimate interest in preserving life.30 Over the past half-
century, however, United States jurisprudence began recognizing an indi-
vidual’s right to privacy and autonomy.31
1. The Debate
The debate surrounding the legalization of assisted dying in the United
States can be traced back to 1906.32 Although nine jurisdictions have ex-
27. Melissa Legault, Note, “I Don’t Want to Die, but I am Dying”: Reexamining Physician-As-
sisted Suicide in a New Age of Substantive Due Process, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 509, 512 (2018) (citing
Chronology of Assisted Dying in the U.S., supra note 1). See also Chamberlain, supra note 7, at 63–64;
Stephanie M. Richards, Death with Dignity: The Right, Choice, and Power of Death by Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 11 CHAR. L. REV. 471, 473–74 (2017); Sean Sweeney, Note, Deadly Speech: Encour-
aging Suicide and Problematic Prosecutions, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 941, 946 (2017).
28. Chamberlain, supra note 7, at 63 (“Anglo-America inherited a common-law tradition from
England that penalized both those who committed suicide and those who assisted suicide.”).
29. Id. at 63.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut statute
banning the sale of contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends the right to contraception to non-married indi-
viduals); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (ruling women have a constitutional right to privacy regard-
ing abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that individuals have a constitutional right
to marry each other, regardless of race); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that
individuals of the same sex have a constitution right to marry one another).
32. Chronology of Assisted Dying in the U.S., supra note 1.
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pressly adopted PAS laws,33 the tension between those in favor and those
against PAS continues to rage on across the country.34 Indeed, except for
Hawaii and Washington, each time a jurisdiction has codified PAS legisla-
tion, opponents have introduced legislation or have instituted litigation to
repeal the newly-adopted legislation.35
While proponents argue that there is a constitutional liberty interest in
choosing to die through PAS,36 opponents of legalizing PAS argue that the
state’s interest in protecting life outweighs this personal liberty interest.37 In
their arguments, proponents of PAS typically cite to inadequate palliative
care in pain management and the right to choose one’s means of death with
dignity.38 Additionally, proponents argue that refusing life-sustaining treat-
ment, which is legal in most states,39 produces the same end results as
PAS—death of the terminally-ill patient. Thus, in their view, there is no
substantive basis for distinguishing the legality of death by refusing life-
sustaining treatment and PAS.40 Conversely, opponents of PAS typically
cite to the state’s interest in preserving life and preventing suicide, main-
taining the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting vulnerable
groups.41
2. Oregon and the Rise of Physician-Assisted Suicide Legislation
Although those in opposition to PAS vehemently fought against its
legalization, the right to die was first recognized as an individual right in
33. These jurisdictions include California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, New
Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
34. Doctors Debate About Physician-assisted Suicide, NEWS MEDICAL, https://perma.cc/7H9V-
Q7JG (last visited March 28, 2020) (“Few issues in medicine have been more controversial in recent
years than physician-assisted suicide.”). In 2020, sixteen states considered PAS legislation. Take Action
in Your State, supra note 3.
35. See, e.g., California, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://perma.cc/5Y9M-V3WU (last visited July
28, 2020); New Jersey, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://perma.cc/88MA-5LAQ (last visited July 28,
2020); Vermont, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://perma.cc/9PYV-XUBP (last visited July 28, 2020).
36. Chamberlain, supra note 7, at 72.
37. Rachel D. Kleinberg & Toshiro M. Mochizuki, The Final Freedom: Maintaining Autonomy and
Valuing Life in Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 209 (Winter 1997).
38. Cathy Lu, The Debate Over Physician-Assisted Suicide, 24 HUM RTS. Q. 8, 8 (Fall, 1997)
39. Elizabeth Helene Adamson, Comment, The Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical Treatment
and the Noncompetent Terminally Ill Patient: An Analysis of Abridgment and Anarchy, 17 PEPP. L. REV.
461, 464 (1990).
40. Chamberlain, supra note 7, at 73-74.
41. Id. at 79. See also Bryan Hillard, The Politics of Palliative Care and the Ethical Boundaries of
Medicine: Gonzales v. Oregon as a Cautionary Tale, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 158 (2007); Melvin I.
Urofsky, Do Go Gentle into That Good Night: Thoughts on Death, Suicide, Morality and the Law, 59
ARK. L. REV. 819 (2007); Stephen W. Smith, Evidence for the Practical Slippery Slope in the Debate on
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 13 MED. L. REV. 17 (2005); Carrie H. Pailet, Comment,
Abortion and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Is there a Constitutional Right to Both? 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
45 (2006).
6
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the United States in the 1990s.42 In the midst of disputes in court regarding
assisted dying as a fundamental right, Oregon voters passed Ballot Measure
1643 in 1994, approving the adoption of PAS in the state.44 After the adop-
tion of Measure 16, there were numerous unsuccessful attempts to repeal
the Act.45 Thus, Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act46 went into effect in
1997, making Oregon the first state to legalize assisted death in the United
States.47
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court heard two cases regarding
the right to die—Vacco v. Quill48 and Washington v. Glucksberg.49 In both
decisions, the Court held that an individual does not have a fundamental
right to die and that the state has legitimate interests in preserving the life of
individuals.50 However, in both cases the Court recognized the inadequacy
of current palliative care, insinuating that there may be a constitutional right
to PAS, and thereby opening the door for the possibility of hearing cases
regarding the issue in the future.51
Nearly ten years later, in 2006, the Court once again heard a case re-
garding assisted death after Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act was in effect
for almost a decade.52 In Gonzales v. Oregon,53 the Court held that, under
the clear language of the federal Controlled Substance Act,54 the Attorney
General cannot prohibit physicians from prescribing drugs to facilitate
PAS.55 Gonzales was the last time the Court has heard argument regarding
the right to die.56
42. See Chronology of Assisted Dying in the U.S., supra note 1.
43. Ballot Measure 16 reads: “Shall law allow terminally ill adult patients voluntarily informed
choice to obtain physician’s prescription for drugs to end life?” Voters’ Pamphlet, OR, (Nov. 8, 1994),
available at https://perma.cc/YN5Z-XLMU. Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 16 by a narrow
margin of fifty-one percent to forty-nine percent. Basics on . . . Ballot Measure 51, OR. LEGISLATIVE
POLICY & RESEARCH OFFICE (Oct. 1997), available at https://perma.cc/LQV7-VWVD.
44. Oregon, supra note 15.
45. See, e.g., Lee v. Harcleroad, 522 U.S. 927 (1997) (cert. denied); Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382
(9th Cir. 1997); Lee v. Oregon, 819 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995); see also Basics on . . . Ballot Measure
51, supra note 43.
46. Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act is codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (2020).
47. Oregon, supra note 15.
48. 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (challenging New York’s outlawing of PAS on Equal Protection grounds).
49. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (challenging Washington’s PAS ban on substantive due process grounds).
50. Chamberlain, supra note 7, at 68–69.
51. Id. at 72.
52. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
53. Id.
54. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2020).
55. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 244.
56. Chronology of Assisted Dying in the U.S., supra note 1.
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Since the inception of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, eight other
states have enacted laws legalizing PAS,57 the most recent of which were
Maine and New Jersey in 2019.58 Additionally, the Montana Supreme
Court held in Baxter v. State59 that Montana law prohibits PAS,60 although
the state has not codified PAS.61 Since Baxter, Montana legislators have
introduced several bills to codify or ban the practice of PAS, but none of
these bills have passed.62 Thus, while Montana may enact PAS legislation
in the future, PAS is currently codified in only nine jurisdictions.63
Due to the success of Oregon’s statute, existing state statutes legalizing
PAS have mirrored Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.64 Codified PAS stat-
utes “allow mentally competent adult state residents who have a terminal
illness with a confirmed prognosis of . . . [six] or fewer months to live to
voluntarily request and receive a prescription medication to hasten their in-
evitable, imminent death.”65 These statutes require stringent safeguards to
protect patients and prevent misuse of the system.66 These safeguards in-
clude, among those listed above, that “two physicians must confirm the
patient’s residency, diagnosis, prognosis, mental competence, and volunta-
riness . . . [and] [t]wo waiting periods, the first between the oral request [for
prescription], [and] the second between receiving and filling the prescrip-
tion.”67 Other safeguards exist within PAS statutes, including those protect-
ing consumers from denial of benefits across several lines of insurance,
57. California, Colorado, Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington have enacted statutes legalizing PAS. See Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
58. Maine, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://perma.cc/98GX-3GGS (last visited July 28, 2020); New
Jersey, supra note 35.
59. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
60. Id. at 1221 (“[A]s a generalized reflection of the legislature’s views on third party involvement
in suicides, there remains no indication that the statute was ever intended to apply to the very narrow set
of circumstances in which a terminally ill patient himself seeks out a physician and asks the physician to
provide him the means to end his own life.”) (emphasis in original).
61. Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13.
62. Id. See also Montana, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/montana/
(last visited Apr. 4. 2020). Senate Bill 202 would have modeled Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act,
outlining requirements for individuals to participate in PAS. S.B. 202, 64th Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mont. 2015). Montana legislators considered two other Senate bills in 2011 and 2013 that would have
legalized PAS. See S.B. 167, 63rd Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011); S.B. 220, 64th Mont. Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mont. 2013). House Bill 536 and House Bill 284 would have created a law explicitly criminaliz-
ing physician aid in dying. H.B. 536, 65th Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017); H.B. 284, 66th Mont.
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2019).
63. Take Action in Your State, supra note 3. Sixteen other states considered death with dignity
statutes in 2020. Id. These states include Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia,
and Wisconsin. Id.
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including life insurance.68 For example, Section 127.875 of the Oregon Re-
vised Statutes reads:
The sale, procurement, or issuance of any life, health, or accident insurance
or annuity policy or the rate charged for any policy shall not be conditioned
upon or affected by the making or rescinding of a request, by a person, for
medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner. Neither
shall a qualified patient’s act of ingesting medication to end his or her life in
a humane and dignified manner have an effect upon life, health, or accident
insurance or annuity policy.69
In 2019 alone, twenty states considered right-to-die legislation,70 two
of which passed right-to-die laws.71 Thus far in 2020, sixteen states are
considering PAS legislation.72 As more states adopt PAS laws, it is impera-
tive that these laws model Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act in order to
provide similar protections for consumers across the country. These protec-
tions will ensure that consumers have fair access and treatment throughout
the decision-making process revolving around PAS, regardless of their geo-
graphic location. Additionally, these protections must include provisions re-
quiring insurers to honor insurance payouts for insureds who elect to par-
ticipate in PAS. Thus, it is essential that new and existing laws, including
Oregon’s model Death with Dignity Act, adopt clear and explicit language
indicating that an insurance policy involving an insured who participates in
PAS is not effected by the insured’s participation in PAS, regardless of any
policy provisions to the contrary.
B. Life Insurance in the United States
Life insurance is one of many lines of insurance. Historically, insur-
ance was divided among three basic types: (1) life, (2) fire and marine, and
(3) casualty.73 Due to multiple line development and the prominence of
health insurance, modern insurance is divided into two general lines: (1) life
and health, and (2) property and casualty.74 The focus of this paper is life
insurance.
Tracing its roots back as far as Ancient Egypt, life insurance has be-
come one of the most important and most purchased insurance products in
68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-115 (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-661.009 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-17 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(19) (2019);
N.J. STAT. § 26:16-14 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.875 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5287 (2020);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.170 (2020).
69. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.875 (2020).
70. Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
71. Maine and New Jersey passed PAS legislation during the 2019 legislative session. See From
First Bill to Final Win, supra note 18.
72. Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
73. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 18.
74. Id. at 19.
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the world.75 According to the Insurance Information Institute, in 2015,
global life insurance premiums exceeded $2.5 trillion, and U.S. premiums
totaled $552 billion.76 Like other lines of insurance, life insurers transfer
payments from those who pay a premium to the pool of group funds.77 Life
insurance is different than other lines of insurance, however, in that it “is
essentially a contract to make specific payments upon the death of the per-
son whose life is insured.”78
Unlike other lines of insurance that guard against uncertain risk,79 life
insurance insures the loss of death, which is certain to occur.80 Thus, the
“risk” profile of an individual does not calculate if a person will die, but
rather, when the person will die.81 Although life insurers accept a risk that is
certain to occur, insurers nonetheless classify individuals based on their po-
tential risk—in this case, through actuarial formulas and data regarding the
person’s calculated life span.82 Risk can also be classified depending on the
characteristics of the individual insureds (e.g., age, weight, and habits),
thereby varying premium rates depending on how each insured is classi-
fied.83 The process of creating risk profiles is often necessary for insurers
due to the phenomenon of adverse selection.84 Adverse selection is the con-
cept that high-risk entities are more likely to seek out insurance.85 Thus,
based on these classifications, insurers can refuse to insure an individual or
a business altogether. For example, if a person has a terminal illness and
seeks a life insurance policy, the insurer may, and probably will, decline to
sell the consumer a policy due to the high risk of loss predicated upon the
person’s illness.86 Alternatively, the insurer may raise the applicant’s pre-
miums to an extraordinary amount that most people cannot afford.87 The
process of identifying entities most likely to suffer losses and charging them
75. Id. at 723.
76. INS. INFO. INST., 2017 INSURANCE FACT BOOK 1–2 (2017).
77. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 723.
78. JOHN F. DOBBYN & CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 8 (5th ed. 2016).
See also STEVEN PLITT, DANIEL MALDONADO, JOSHUA D. ROGERS & JORDAN R. PLITT, 12A COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 179:1 (3d ed. Dec. 2019 Update).
79. JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS
AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 14 (2010).
80. COUCH ON INSURANCE § 102:9, supra note 78.
81. Id. at § 179:1.
82. Id. at § 1:39.
83. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 8–9.
84. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9
CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 376–77 (2003).
85. Id. at 373.
86. See generally FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 8–9; see also Baker, supra note 85, at 378.
87. See generally FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 8–9.
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higher premiums, or refusing to insure them altogether, is known as reverse
adverse selection.88
Another distinction between life insurance and other lines of insurance
is the designation of a beneficiary to the policy.89 Unlike other lines of
insurance, in which the policyholder or injured third party receive benefits
from the policy, life insurance policies pay out benefits to designated bene-
ficiaries.90
A final distinction between life insurance and other lines of insurance
is the characters involved in a life insurance policy.91 There are four distinct
entities involved in a life insurance policy: (1) the insurer, (2) the owner of
the policy,92 (3) the person whose life is the subject of the policy, otherwise
known as the cestui que vie, and (4) the beneficiary or beneficiaries to
whom the proceeds are paid.93 The latter three entities can be represented
by one person by naming the person’s estate as the beneficiary of the pol-
icy, or by three separate people, each occupying a different role.94
1. Incontestability Clauses
One prominent issue that arises with contractual obligations of life in-
surance policies is that of incontestability clauses.95 Incontestability clauses
“protect an insured from a contest concerning the validity of the policy,”96
thereby barring the insurance company from disputing liability after a cer-
tain time frame.97 In a way, incontestability clauses act as a statute of limi-
tations for insurers to dispute liability based on the insurance contract’s
88. Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk Management, 17 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 1081, 1122 n.173 (2015); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exag-
gerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1253 (2004) (referring to reverse adverse selection as “cream-
skimming”).
89. See generally FRANKLIN L. BEST, JR., 1 LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE LAW § 11:1 (2d ed. Aug.
2019 Update).
90. See generally id.
91. See generally FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 723.
92. This person “has the power to name or change the beneficiary, the right to assign the policy
(under certain conditions), the ability to cash it in for its surrender value, or use it as collateral in
obtaining a loan, and the obligation to pay the premiums.” Id. at 723.
93. Id.
94. Id. See also BEST, JR., supra note 89, at § 2:11.
95. See generally FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 735–43.
96. 44 AM. JUR. 2D INSURANCE § 749 (2018). See, e.g., Powell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New
York, 144 N.E. 825 (Ill. 1924); Simpson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 247 N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1969);
Minnesota Mututal Life Ins. Co. v. Morse, 487 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. 1972). See also Cristina Alonso,
Imposter Fraud and Incontestability Clauses in Life Insurance Policies, 80 FLA. B.J. 68, 68 (2006).
97. Katherine Cooper, Liar’s Poker: The Effect of Incontestability Clauses After Paul Revere Life
Insurance Co. v. Haas, 1 CONN. INS. L.J. 225, 227 (1995).
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validity.98 Most states statutorily require incontestability clauses for the
purpose of protecting consumers.99 These clauses arose from insurers deny-
ing coverage based on a misstatement by the policyholder made during the
application process.100 With knowledge of a misstatement in the applica-
tion, insurers stealthily refrained from mentioning the misstatement until an
insured passed away and was therefore no longer able to dispute the mis-
statement.101 The practice of failing to contest a misstatement in an applica-
tion for insurance in a timely manner left beneficiaries in a vulnerable posi-
tion in which they were forced to battle the powerful insurance companies
for payment of benefits.102
An incontestability clause typically states that a policy cannot be con-
tested, except for nonpayment of premiums, after a specific time frame,103
depending on the statutory scheme and/or the insurer’s choice of lan-
guage.104 Indeed, the standard text of an incontestability clause reads: “This
policy shall be incontestable after it has been in force during the lifetime of
the insured, for a period of two years from the issue date, except for non-
payment of premiums.”105 An incontestability clause, however, does not bar
contestability completely—an insurer is free to launch an investigation and/
or contest liability under the contract within the contestable period.106 Fur-
ther, if the cestui que vie dies within the contestable period, the insurer may
contest the validity of the contract beyond the contestable period.107
With regard to fraud and misrepresentation, many courts have held that
an insurer’s defense of fraud is subject to the incontestability clause, i.e.,
98. See id.; Erin Wessling, Contracts-Applying the Plain Language to Incontestability Clauses
Kersten v. Minnestota Mutual Life Insurance Co., 607 N.W.2D 869 (Minn. 2000), 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV., 1253, 1255 (2000).
99. 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 749 (2018). See, e.g., New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Doe, 710
N.E.2d 1060, 1062 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that one purpose of incontestability clauses is to protect con-
sumers).
100. 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:94 (4th ed. 2018) (Insurers “resisted liability stubbornly on
the basis of some misstatement made by the insured at the time of applying for the policy.”). See also
Wessling, supra note 98, at 1256. (“[T]he insured commonly paid premiums for a long period of time
and the insurance company would later void the contract for a minor reason when the payment of
benefits was due.”).
101. 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:94 (4th ed. 2018) (“[Insurers] carefully refrained from com-
ment until the insured had died and was unable to testify in his or her own behalf.”). This practice is
otherwise known as “post-claim underwriting” and is not unusual because “insurers typically use every
means at their disposal to deny claims to the extent legally permissible.” See FRENCH & JERRY, supra
note 26, at 64.
102. 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:94 (4th ed. 2018). See, e.g., Wischmeyer v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
103. The incontestability time frame usually occurs after twelve or twenty-four months from the
issue date of the policy. 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:94 (4th ed. 2018).
104. Id. See also FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 741.
105. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 741.
106. 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:94 (4th ed. 2018).
107. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 741.
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the insurer may not contest liability under the defense of fraud if the con-
testability period has lapsed.108 Some insurance policies even include a
fraud exception within the incontestability clause, allowing the insurer to
contest liability for fraud even after the contestable period has lapsed.109
Nonetheless, courts are split as to whether an explicit fraud exception in the
policy should be enforced.110 There are typically only two exceptions that
universally apply to incontestability clauses in which insurers may contest
the contract even after the contestable period has passed.111 These excep-
tions include (1) nonpayment of premiums, and (2) breach of warranty re-
lating to military or naval service in time of war.112
2. Suicide Clauses
Like incontestability clauses, some insurers include suicide clauses
within their life insurance policies.113 Suicide clauses generally exclude
coverage for death by suicide114 and insurers generally return the monthly
payments made toward the policy’s premium, at least for suicides that occur
within the contestable period.115 Suicide clauses act as a deterrent for in-
sureds who purchase life insurance with the intent to harm themselves.116
An issue arises when a life insurance policy includes both a suicide clause
and an incontestability clause.117 Most courts hold that, if the suicide occurs
within the contestable period, the suicide clause is simply a risk that is not
108. Id. at 742. See, e.g., Bankers Sec. Life Ins. Soc’y v. Kane, 885 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1989)
(applying Florida law); Perry v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 362 S.W.2d 213–14 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1962); Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Fima, 105 F.3d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying California law to
an incontestability clause in the context of a disability policy).
109. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 742.
110. Id. Compare Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 682 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Mass. 1997) (holding
that a fraud exception within the policy was not binding and the Massachusetts incontestability statute
prohibited an insurer from enforcing a fraud exception within the policy), with New England Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Doe, 710 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (N.Y. 1999) (ruling that an insurer may include a provision in
its contestability clause creating an exception for “fraudulent misstatements”).
111. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 335.
112. Id. at 335.
113. See generally Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Suicide clause of life or accident insurance as
affected by incontestable clause, 37 A.L.R. 3D 337 (1971).
114. Id. (Suicide clauses “exclude as a risk insured against under the policy the death of the insured
by his own hand, or provide that the policy becomes void if the insured commits suicide”). See also
Kelly S. Noble, Accidental Death . . . Or Was It? The Question of Suicide in Life and Accidental Death
Insurance, 39 A.B.A. BRIEF 50, 51 (2010).
115. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 208.
116. Noble, supra note 115, at 51. (“The suicide exclusion is intended to protect the insurance com-
pany against adverse selection by preventing people who are contemplating suicide from first securing
life insurance to protect their surviving beneficiaries.”).
117. See generally Tinio, supra note 114. See also Effect of Incontestability Clause Upon Provision
for Limited Liability in Case of Suicide, Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 1050, 1052–53 (1930); Suicide and
Insurance, 49 HARV. L. REV. 304, 304–05 (1935).
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covered under the policy.118 Thus, by denying coverage for suicide, the
insurer is not “contesting” the validity of the contract, but rather, reading
the suicide clause as a stipulation in the contract.119
The interpretation of the language in the insurance contract is strained
when a suicide occurs after the contestability period has lapsed.120 Some
courts hold the same viewpoint in this scenario as when the suicide occurs
within the contestable period—i.e., the suicide clause is an exclusion from
the policy and the insurer is not challenging the validity of the contract, but
rather, is enforcing the terms of the contract.121 Still, courts are split on this
issue, and some have held that the incontestability clause does not exclude
suicide from its terms.122 In jurisdictions that do not exclude suicide from
the contractual terms, the insurer is forbidden from denying payment for a
suicide occurring after the contestability period.123
3. Insurer Defenses
In addition to the limitations of coverage expressed in the policy, in-
surers may void insurance contracts by asserting the defenses of conceal-
ment or misrepresentation.124 Both of these defenses are grounded in com-
mon law principles of contract law.125
Concealment occurs when an insured intentionally fails to disclose
“material information.”126 Material information includes any information
specifically inquired about on an application for insurance.127 When an in-
surer asks a question of the applicant, the information is presumed to be
material in determining the applicant’s risk profile.128 Material information
also includes any statements made by the applicant prior to the insurer issu-
118. Tinio, supra note 114, at § 3. See, e.g., Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Bieniek, 312 F.2d 365 (3d Cir.
1962) (applying Pennsylvania law); Nat’l Producers Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 442 P.2d 876, 877–78
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1968); Nabor v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 396 N.E.2d 1267, 1272 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
119. Tinio, supra note 114, at § 3; see also Suicide and Insurance, supra note 118.
120. Tinio, supra note 114, at § 2[a].
121. Id. See, e.g., North Am. Union v. Trenner, 138 Ill. App. 586 (1908); Starck v. Union Cent. Life
Ins. Co., 19 A. 703 (Pa. 1890); Hall v. Mututal Reserve Fund Life Ass’n, 19 Pa. Super. 31 (1902);
Childress v. Fraternal Union of Am., 82 S.W. 832 (Tenn. 1904).
122. Tinio, supra note 114, at § 2[a]. See, e.g., Seymour v. Mut. Protective League, 155 Ill. App. 21,
23–27 (1910); Mareck v. Mututal Reserve Fund Life Ass’n, 64 N.W. 68 (Minn. 1895).
123. Tinio, supra note 114, at § 2[a].
124. See generally DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 311–27.
125. Joseph K. Powers, Pulling the Plug on Fidelity, Crime, and All Risk Coverage: The Availability
of Rescission as a Remedy or Defense, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 905, 905–06. See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(l) (1981).
126. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 316.
127. Powers, supra note 126, at 918–19.
128. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 314–15, 318 (“[W]hen the insurer specifically asks about
something on the application or in person, it is presumed that the information is material to the insurer’s
decision, despite any lack of objective relevance to the risk.”).
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ing the policy.129 In the United States, a policyholder does not have a duty
to disclose any information that is not specifically inquired about by the
insurer.130 In other words, an insurer must assess the risk independently and
cannot fault a policyholder for failing to disclose important information for
which the insurer fails to inquire.131 For example, to confirm the answers in
an application for insurance, a life insurer may require a potential insured to
submit to an independent medical examination (“IME”) performed by a
physician of the insurer’s choosing to determine any health concerns prior
to drafting an insurance policy.132 If the IME reveals any health defects, the
insurer will likely raise premiums for that policyholder, or will refuse to
insure the person altogether under the principle of reverse adverse selec-
tion.133
Some applications for insurance contain provisions requiring the poli-
cyholder to “represent that it has disclosed all material information.”134 De-
spite the language in these provisions, courts have generally held that the
policyholder need not disclose information in good faith, but rather, must
not disclose information in bad faith.135 Further, to void a policy, the in-
surer must prove that it was misled by the concealment.136
Although the requirements vary between states, similar to conceal-
ment, a misrepresentation generally occurs when a representation137 by the
policyholder is: (1) material, and (2) false or misleading.138 In determining
materiality, the majority of courts look to whether the information provided
would generally influence the decision of the reasonable insurer to issue a
policy from the beginning or at that specific premium rate.139 To void an
insurance contract, the insurer must also have reasonably relied upon the
129. Powers, supra note 126, at 918–19.
130. Id. at 918. Note: This does not apply to marine insurance in the United States. See DOBBYN &
FRENCH, supra note 78, at 315.
131. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 313. (“[U]nder American law, it is not the policyholder’s
duty. To figure out what information the insurer would find material to the risk and then to disclose such
information.”).
132. Id. at 312.
133. See generally FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 8–9. See also Baker, supra note 85, at 378.
134. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 314.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 315. The test to determine whether the insurer was misled is “whether the reasonable
insurer would be misled.” Id.
137. A representation is “any statement, oral or written, express or implied, made by the policy-
holder to the insurer which forms at least part of the basis on which the insurer decides to enter into the
contract of insurance. A representation does not become a term of the contract unless it is expressly
incorporated into the written document.” Id. at 316.
138. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 45 (State statutes govern misrepresentations to insurance
companies). See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 31A-21-105 (2020); N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 3105 (McKinney,
2019); 40 P.S. STAT. § 757 (1921).
139. Powers, supra note 126, at 914–15. For example, “prior medical history of an applicant is
generally material to an insurer’s decision to issue a life insurance policy.” Id. at 914.
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misrepresentation in determining whether to insure the individual or at what
specific premium with which to charge the individual.140
The insurer must assert a defense as soon as practical, otherwise the
defense is waived.141 Some states statutorily provide a number of days in
which the insurer must raise the defense after the misrepresentation is dis-
covered to avoid waiver.142 Although, most states apply a reasonableness
test to determine whether the insurer acted in a “reasonable period of time
after the insurer be[came] aware of the misrepresentation.”143 Additionally,
an insured is under no obligation to correct a representation that becomes
untrue after the contract was formed.144
In addition to the defenses of concealment and misrepresentation, in-
surers may also rely on the fortuity doctrine to avoid coverage.145 The for-
tuity doctrine is rooted in preventing fraud and is a central pillar of insur-
ance contracts, governing the principle that insurance will not cover known
losses.146 One legal scholar puts it simply: “[I]nsurance is intended to cover
risks, not certainties.”147 Although insurance contracts typically do not in-
clude fortuity language, courts have held that the doctrine is implied to pre-
clude coverage for non-fortuitous losses.148 Thus, if an insured knows, or
should know, of a loss at the time the policy is purchased, the fortuity doc-
trine will likely preclude coverage of any claim under that policy for the
loss.149
140. Id. at 914–15. Courts use an objective test to analyze what the “reasonable insurer” would have
relied upon in the particular scenario. Id. at 917.
141.  DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 318. For example, if the insurer does not contest the
validity of the policy within the contestable period, it has waived the right to do so once the contestable
period has lapsed. BEST, JR., supra note 89, at § 6:1 (2d ed. Aug. 2018). For a discussion on waiver, see
infra Part II.B.2.d.
142. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 320.
143. Id. at 319 (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 321.
145. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 270.
146. COUCH ON INSURANCE § 102:9, supra note 78 (“The fortuity doctrine incorporates the ‘known
loss’ and ‘loss in progress’ principles, which focus on the proposition that insurance coverage is pre-
cluded when the insured is, or should be, aware of an ongoing progressive loss or known loss at the time
the policy is purchased.”). See also Andrew C. Whitaker, Rescission of Life Insurance Policies in Texas
– Time to Correct Some Old Errors, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 164 (2007).
147. Matt W. Holey, The “Fortuity Doctrine”: Misapplying the Known Loss Rule to Liability Insur-
ance Policies, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 529, 530 (2009) (emphasis added).
148. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 270. Additionally, some states, such as California, have
codified the fortuity doctrine. Id.
149. COUCH ON INSURANCE § 102:9, supra note 78.
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4. Policyholder Counter-Defenses
In response to an insurer’s attempt to void the policy, the policyholder
may assert two common counter-defenses: waiver and estoppel.150 Al-
though both defenses may be asserted to determine whether coverage under
the written policy applies, neither defense can be asserted to “expand cover-
age not otherwise provided in an insurance contract.”151 The two defenses
are often commonly interchanged synonymously, but they are in fact two
separate principles of law.152 Waiver is based on contract provisions,
whether express or implied, whereas estoppel is an equitable remedy
grounded in tort law.153
Waiver is defined as “an intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a
known right.”154 This defense typically arises when an insurer is aware of
its ability to rescind a policy, but through the words or acts of the insurer’s
agents, voluntarily surrenders that right.155 Because the relinquishment of a
right must be voluntary, a waiver defense will only prevail if: (1) the insurer
had actual knowledge of the grounds for rescission of the policy, or (2) the
insurer had knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable insurer to make
a reasonable inquiry as to the ground for rescission of the policy.156
Estoppel, on the other hand, is defined as express or implicit represen-
tation or conduct by the insurer that reasonably leads the policyholder to
believe that coverage is provided under a policy, resulting in the policy-
holder’s detrimental reliance based upon the insurer’s representation or con-
duct.157 The key element in this type of defense is the policyholder’s detri-
mental reliance on the insurer’s representation or conduct, resulting in a
“prejudicial change of position because of his reliance.”158 Because estop-
pel is an equitable doctrine, the policyholder must be unaware of the true
facts of the misrepresentation at the time the representation is made.159 This
150. BEST, JR., supra note 89, at § 6:14.
151. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 73. See, e.g., Shepard v. Keystone Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp.
429, 433 (D. Md 1990) (applying Maryland law and ruling that “waiver and estoppel cannot be used to
create liability where none previously existed, or to extend coverage beyond what was originally in-
tended”); Martin v. U.S. Fid. And Guar. Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Mo. 1999) (holding that estoppel
cannot create coverage that does not already exist in the insurance contract); Laidlaw v. Envtl. Services
(TOC), Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 524 S.E. 2d 847, 852 (S.C. App. 1999) (holding that waiver
cannot create coverage that does not already exist within the insurance contract).
152. BEST, JR., supra note 89, at § 6:1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 352.
156. Id. at 353.
157. Id. at 361.
158. Id. at 361–62.
159. Id. at 362. See also BEST, JR., supra note 89, at § 6:1. This concept is otherwise known as the
“clean hands” doctrine. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 362.
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paper analyzes the interplay of common defenses and counter-defenses re-
garding the applicability of suicide clauses when an insured participates in
PAS.
III. THREE SCENARIOS CONSIDERING WHETHER BENEFICIARIES OF LIFE
INSURANCE POLICIES IN WHICH THE INSURED PARTICIPATES IN PAS
SHOULD BE DENIED BENEFITS UNDER THE POLICY
Thus far, nine jurisdictions have codified right-to-die laws.160 Of the
nine jurisdictions have codified right-to-die laws, all of them have adopted
specific language requiring insurance companies to honor an insured’s
choice to participate in PAS.161 This part of the paper analyzes the regula-
tory laws of PAS with regard to insurance and annuity policies in three
different scenarios.
A. Scenario 1: The Policyholder Knew of the Terminal Illness Before
Applying for Life Insurance and Disclosed this Information
to the Insurer.
Before issuing an insurance policy to an individual, insurers have the
right to require the policyholder to complete an application for insurance.162
In the life insurance context, an insurer may even request that the insured
submit to an IME by a doctor of the insurer’s choice.163 A typical IME for
life insurance purposes consists of a blood and urine sample; height, weight,
pulse, and blood pressure check; and a series of health questions to confirm
that the information on the insurance application is accurate.164 For more
senior applicants, the physical may also consist of an electrocardiogram to
test for abnormalities in the applicant’s heart.165
The purpose of this process is to “protect the primary interests of the
insurer.”166 To that end, a typical life insurance application form will ask
160. See Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
161. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-115 (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-661.09 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-17 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(19) (2019);
N.J. STAT. § 26:16-14 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.875 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5287 (2020);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.170 (2020).
162. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 40 (“To deal with [the] lack of information [on the insured],
an insurer seeks information regarding the policyholder through the insurance application process.”).
163. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 312 (“[I]n the case of life insurance, the insurer can
require the insured submit to an examination by the insurer’s physician.”).
164. What Do Insurers Look for in a Life Insurance Blood Test and Medical Exam?,
VALUEPENGUIN, https://perma.cc/FQ56-S34Y (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
165. Id.
166. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 311. See also Paul R. Koepff, 3 Law and Practice of
Insurance Coverage Litigation 37:2 (July 2018). These interests include: “(1) clearly determining all
pertinent aspects of the risk for purposes of deciding whether to issue the policy and at what premium,
18
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the applicant to answer a series of questions regarding any known diseases
or illnesses.167 These questions may include information regarding diseases
of the brain or nervous system, heart disease, respiratory disease, gastroin-
testinal diseases, sexually transmitted diseases, and cancerous diseases,
among others.168 Assuming the applicant truthfully discloses the knowledge
of a terminal disease, the insurer would likely participate in reverse adverse
selection to refuse to sell insurance to the individual. In this case, the appli-
cant has no claim against the insurance company because the insurance
company is able to refuse to sell insurance to high-risk individuals if it so
chooses.
Conversely, an issue may arise if the insurance company decides to
insure the terminally-ill individual, although this situation is highly unlikely
because the insurer will almost certainly decline to sell life insurance to
someone with a terminal illness. Because PAS laws deem an individual
with less than six months to live as terminally ill,169 an insured participating
in PAS will logically commit suicide within the contestable period of the
insurance contract.170 If this situation occurs, then the insurer may contest
the validity of the contract in an attempt to avoid payouts to the benefi-
ciaries of the policy.171 The insurer may also attempt to void the policy
under the fortuity doctrine.172
To defend such a suit, the policyholder could rely upon two counter-
defenses: waiver and estoppel.173 The policyholder can assert a waiver de-
fense by arguing that because the insurer knew of the existing illness based
on the policyholder’s responses to the insurance application and results of
any IME, and because the insurer nonetheless voluntarily accepted the risk,
the insurer does not have a claim for voiding the policy.174 The policy-
holder can argue that the insurer knowingly and voluntarily relinquished its
and (2) being able to contain the risk within the intended bounds once the policy has been issued.”
DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 311.
167. Individual Life Insurance Application Standards, INTERSTATE INS. PROD. REGULATION COMM’N
(Oct. 29, 2008), https://perma.cc/PL3W-FM67; see also Individual Life Insurance Application, NAT’L
ASS’N OF ACCREDITED INS. PROF’LS, https://perma.cc/65DM-H3D3 (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
168. Id.; see also Individual Life Insurance Application Standards, supra note 167.
169. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2020) (defining “terminal disease”).
170. The contestable period is typically within two years of the effective date of the policy. See 16
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:94 (4th ed. 2018).
171. FRENCH & JERRY, supra note 26, at 64 (“[I]nsurers typically use every means at their disposal
to deny claims to the extent legally permissible.”).
172. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 312 (“[I]n the case of life insurance, the insurer can
require the insured submit to an examination by the insurer’s physician.”).
173. What Do Insurers Look for in a Life Insurance Blood Test and Medical Exam?, supra note 164.
174. Id.
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right to refuse insuring the individual by offering a policy for coverage
despite the known risks.175
Similarly, the policyholder may assert an estoppel counter-defense.
The policyholder can argue that, through the insurer issuing a policy despite
the known risks, the policyholder detrimentally relied upon the insurer’s
conduct by paying premiums and not shopping for other insurance. Under
this approach, the policyholder can argue that the insurer is estopped from
voiding the policy.
Under a traditional application of the fortuity doctrine, however, both
of these counter-defenses could fail. Although death is certain to occur
when purchasing a life insurance policy,176 the fortuity doctrine nonetheless
applies to prevent fraudulent purchases of life insurance.177 In the proposed
scenario, because the insured was aware of the terminal illness at the time
of purchasing the life insurance, and purchased the insurance knowing the
terminal illness would cause the insured to perish within six months,178 the
insurer arguably could deny coverage to the insured’s beneficiaries based
on an implied exclusion under the fortuity doctrine.179
Although the fortuity doctrine could allow the insurer to disclaim cov-
erage, coverage should nonetheless apply when an insured participates in
PAS under this scenario, regardless of policy language to the contrary. PAS
is an atypical suicide for a myriad of reasons. Merriam-Webster defines
“suicide” as “the act or instance of taking one’s own life voluntarily and
intentionally.”180 Although physician-assisted suicide involves the taking of
one’s own life voluntarily and intentionally, it also includes two important
caveats that distinguish it from that of a suicide in the common vernacular:
(1) PAS is expressly legal in jurisdictions that have enacted right-to-die
laws;181 and (2) these jurisdictions require the individual be terminally ill,
defined as having six months or less to live,182 to participate in PAS.183
175. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 311. See also Koepff, supra note 166, at 37:2 (July 2018).
These interests include: “(1) clearly determining all pertinent aspects of the risk for purposes of deciding
whether to issue the policy and at what premium, and (2) being able to contain the risk within the
intended bounds once the policy has been issued.” DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 311.
176. COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 78, at § 179:1.
177. Whitaker, supra note 146, at 164–65.
178. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2020) (defining “terminal disease”).
179. Whitaker, supra note 146, at 164–65 (“Although an insured’s death is undoubtedly a certainty,
his fraudulent nondisclosure of a serious health condition that is in the process of shortening his life runs
afoul of the doctrine of fortuity and justified the rescission of his life insurance coverage.”).
180. Suicide, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2016).
181. These jurisdictions include California, Colorado, Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Maine, New
Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
182. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-102 (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-661.01 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-1 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(2)(M) (2019);
N.J. STAT. § 26:16-3 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5281 (2020);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.010 (2020).
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Additionally, insureds participating in PAS differ significantly from other
individuals who choose to end their own lives—a person participating in
PAS has a set amount of time to live,184 whereas the life span of other
insureds committing suicide is unknown.185 Because a terminally ill insured
will perish within a limited time regardless of whether they participate in
PAS, beneficiaries of the insured’s life insurance policy should receive the
benefits of the policy, regardless of contractual language to the contrary. By
ruling otherwise, allowing suicide clauses to control whether beneficiaries
of an insured participating in PAS receive their rightful benefits, courts
would allow insurers to discriminate against those individuals who are ter-
minally ill, thereby frustrating the purpose of right-to-die laws.
The purpose of the right-to-die laws is for terminally-ill individuals to
choose their manner of death in a dignified, controlled manner; the purpose
is not meant to defraud insurance companies.186 Thus, the insurance pol-
icy’s beneficiaries should not be punished for expedition of the insured’s
impending death through PAS, just as beneficiaries should not be punished
for an insured’s natural death. Whether the insured participates in PAS in
order to die in a swift, dignified manner, or the insured perishes through the
drawn-out, painful manner of a natural death, the insurer will nonetheless
owe the insured’s beneficiaries payment within six months. Therefore, be-
cause of the distinction between a “typical” suicide and PAS, and in con-
junction with the legislative intent of right-to-die laws, suicide clauses
should not apply to an insured who participates in PAS, despite policy lan-
guage to the contrary.
B. Scenario 2: The Policyholder Knew of the Terminal Illness Before
Applying for Life Insurance and Failed to Disclose this
Information to the Insurer.
As discussed in the previous scenario, an insurer has a right to require
a potential policyholder to complete an insurance application form, and in
the context of life insurance, submit a potential insured to an IME by a
183. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.2 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-103 (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-661.03 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-2 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140 (2019); N.J.
STAT. § 26:16-2 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283 (2020);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.020 (2020).
184. A terminally-ill patient participating in PAS must be diagnoses with a terminal illness that will
result in death in six months or less. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2020) (defining “terminal disease”).
185. The concept that, although an insured’s life span can be estimated, but remains unknown, is a
central canon of risk profiling in the life insurance context. See supra Part II.B.
186. Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13 (“[T]he basic idea . . . [is that] the terminally ill people
. . . should make their end-of-life decisions and determine how much pain and suffering they should
endure . . . [b]y adding a voluntary option to the continuum of end-of-life care, these laws give patients
dignity, control, and peace of mind during their final days with family and loved ones.”).
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physician of the insurer’s choice. The physician will likely not submit the
potential insured to extensive tests during the IME;187 thus, it is unlikely
that a physician will detect a terminal disease during the IME unless the
terminally-ill individual notifies the physician of the illness.188 Therefore,
the insurer will primarily rely on the information provided on the insurance
application when determining whether to provide coverage for the individ-
ual.189 If a policyholder falsifies information about the insured having a
terminal disease on an insurance application, or if the policyholder com-
pletely omits the information, the application will be skewed, and the in-
surer’s acceptance of the risk will be misinformed. In this situation, the
insurer can, and likely will, contest the validity of the insurance policy
under the defenses of concealment or misrepresentation.
Under the concealment defense, the insurer can argue that the policy-
holder withheld a material fact in bad faith by omitting information that was
specifically asked about on the application for insurance. Because the in-
surer specifically included questions regarding the insured’s health and
wellness, the information is presumed to be material to the insurer’s deci-
sion in issuing an insurance policy to the policyholder. This defense is lim-
ited based on the facts of the case.190 For example, if the policyholder sim-
ply missed a question on the policy, the policy is incomplete on its face, and
it is therefore obvious that the insurer should not rely on the application
before issuing the policy.191 In this scenario, the policy would not be sub-
ject to voidance.192 If, however, the policyholder answered all of the ques-
tions, but omitted the terminal illness in an answer with which the illness
should have been reported, then the insurer can assert the concealment de-
fense.193 Thus, a reasonable insurer would be misled if the policyholder
omitted information that was asked about on an otherwise seemingly com-
plete application and could therefore assert this defense during the contesta-
ble period.194
Additionally, the insurer could assert the misrepresentation defense if
the policyholder represented false information on the policy by affirming or
denying statements. Therefore, if the insurance application specifically
asked a question that would require the policyholder to disclose the exis-
tence of a terminal illness, and the policyholder lied about the insured hav-
187. What Do Insurers Look for in a Life Insurance Blood Test and Medical Exam?, supra note 164.
188. See generally id.
189. Id.






Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-2\MON203.txt unknown Seq: 23 28-AUG-20 11:49
2020 A RIGHT TO DIE 235
ing the illness, the insurer could void the policy within the contestable pe-
riod.
Based on the defenses of concealment and misrepresentation, a suicide
clause in this scenario is likely irrelevant. Because an insured participating
in PAS would logically die within the contestable period, based on the defi-
nition of “terminal disease,”195 the insurer would likely be able to void the
insurance policy solely on concealment or misrepresentation defenses with-
out making an argument based on the suicide clause. A suicide clause
would only be relevant if the court held that a reasonable insurer would not
have been misled by a policyholder’s omission or misrepresentation of
facts, as discussed in Section II.B.2.d. of this paper.
C. Scenario 3: The Policyholder Did Not Know About the Terminal
Illness Prior to Applying for Life Insurance, and thus,
Could Not Disclose the Information to the Insurer.
As with the last two scenarios, prior to the issuance of the life insur-
ance policy, a policyholder in this situation likely completed an application
for insurance and possibly submitted to an IME. In this scenario, however,
the policyholder was not able to inform the insurer of the existence of a
terminal illness because the policyholder either: (1) was unaware of the
existence of the illness; or (2) the insured contracted the disease after the
issuance of the policy. In either situation, the insurer should not be able to
void the policy after the insured participates in PAS.
Unlike Scenario 2, the insured cannot successfully assert the conceal-
ment or misrepresentation defenses in this scenario because the policy-
holder could not possibly conceal or misrepresent a fact of which the poli-
cyholder was unaware at the time of completing the application. Because
the policyholder has no duty to inform the insurer of the development of a
terminal disease after the insurance policy was issued,196 the insurer could
not assert the defenses of concealment or misrepresentation unless the poli-
cyholder was aware of the disease prior to the issuance of the policy.197
Therefore, because the policyholder has no duty to inform the insurer of a
new disease after the issuance of the policy, the insurer has no basis to
contest the validity of the insurance policy within the contestable period.
195. A person is considered “terminally ill” under PAS statutes if the person is diagnosed with six
months or less to live. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2020) (defining “terminal disease”).
196. DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 78, at 315.
197. Id. at 315–16 (“[I]n the case of life insurance, where there is frequently an appreciable period of
time between the submission of the completed application and the issuance of the policy of insurance,
the duty on the part of the insured to disclose new material information continues until the insurer
becomes bound by the contract. During the interim period of time, the insured also has a duty to correct
answers on the application that become untrue.”) (emphasis in original).
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As in Scenario 1, an insurer that includes a suicide clause within the
insurance policy may assert that the contract is void on the ground that the
insured committed suicide within the contestable period. Thus, courts fac-
ing the issue of whether to apply a suicide clause in the case of PAS should
rule that the suicide clause is inapplicable based on public policy surround-
ing the purpose of PAS—for terminally-ill individuals to choose their man-
ner of death in a dignified, controlled manner.198
As discussed in Scenario 1, PAS is an atypical suicide because it is
expressly legal in jurisdictions that have enacted right-to-die laws,199 and
right-to-die jurisdictions require the person participating in PAS to be ter-
minally ill.200 Thus, because an insured eligible to participate in PAS has
only a set time period to live, beneficiaries of the insured’s life insurance
policy should receive the benefits of the policy, regardless of contractual
language to the contrary (e.g., suicide clauses). A ruling to the contrary
would allow insurers to discriminate against terminally-ill individuals,
thereby frustrating the purposes of right-to-die laws—allowing terminally-
ill patients to choose a dignified, controlled death instead of suffering
through a gruesome terminal disease.201 Further, because those eligible to
participate in PAS will perish within six months, expediting the insured’s
death should not affect whether an insurer owes the policy beneficiaries
payment; the insurer will nonetheless owe the policy benefits within six
months, regardless of whether the insured decides to participate in PAS.
Thus, because PAS is distinguishable from a “typical” suicide, and based on
the legislative intent of right-to-die laws, suicide clauses should not apply to
an insured who participates in PAS, regardless of policy language to the
contrary.
198. Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13.
199. These jurisdictions include California, Colorado, Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Maine, New
Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
200. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.2 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-103 (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-661.03 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-2 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140 (2019); N.J.
STAT. § 26:16-2 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283 (2020);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.020 (2020).
201. Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13 (“[T]he basic idea . . . [is that] the terminally ill people
. . . should make their end-of-life decisions and determine how much pain and suffering they should
endure . . . [b]y adding a voluntary option to the continuum of end-of-life care, these laws give patients
dignity, control, and peace of mind during their final days with family and loved ones.”).
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IV. STATES RATIFYING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE LAWS SHOULD
ADOPT LANGUAGE THAT EXPRESSLY REQUIRES INSURANCE COMPANIES TO
HONOR LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES WHEN AN INSURED PARTICIPATES
IN PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE.
Thus far, each of the nine jurisdictions that have statutorily adopted
PAS laws include a section regarding the application of insurance and annu-
ities when an insured participates in PAS.202 For example, the Oregon
Death with Dignity Act explicitly states:
The sale, procurement, or issuance of any life, health, or accident insurance
or annuity policy or the rate charged for any policy shall not be conditioned
upon or affected by the making or rescinding of a request, by a person, for
medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner. Neither
shall a qualified patient’s act of ingesting medication to end his or her life in
a humane and dignified manner have an effect upon life, health, or accident
insurance or annuity policy.203
Because Oregon’s Death with Dignity statute is the model statute re-
garding PAS laws,204 other jurisdictions that have adopted PAS legislation
follow Oregon’s language almost verbatim.205 Aside from Vermont,206
those jurisdictions that differ from Oregon’s legislation differ only slightly
in statutory language,207 but all nine of the jurisdictions require insurers to
honor an insured’s choice to participate in PAS.208
In 2019, eighteen states considered right-to-die legislation,209 and two
states adopted right-to-die laws.210 Thus far in 2020, sixteen states are con-
sidering right-to-die legislation.211 Language requiring insurers to honor an
insured’s choice to participate in PAS is imperative as more states adopt
202. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.2 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-103 (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-661.03 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-2 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(19) (2019);
N.J. STAT. § 26:16-2 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283 (2020);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.020 (2020).
203. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.875 (2020).
204. Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13.
205. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-17 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.170 (2019).
206. Vermont’s statutory language regarding the effect of PAS on insurance policies is unique. Spe-
cifically, Vermont’s Patient Choice at End of Life Act focuses, in part, on a physician’s willingness to
assist a patient with PAS and the effect of that decision on medical malpractice insurance. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 5287(b) (2020).
207. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13(a)(1) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-115 (2020);
D.C. CODE § 7-661.009 (2020); ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140 (2019); N.J. STAT. § 26:16-14(c) (2019).
208. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-115 (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-661.009 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-17 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(19) (2019);
N.J. STAT. § 26:16-14 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.875 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5287 (2020);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.170 (2020).
209. Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
210. Maine and New Jersey adopted PAS legislation during the 2019 legislative session. See From
First Bill to Final Win, supra note 18.
211. Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
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PAS statutes. Aside from the unpredictability, time, and costs associated
with litigation,212 failure to adopt language explicitly requiring insurance
companies to honor the policyholder’s insurance contract, regardless of the
insured’s participation in PAS, carries significant public policy implica-
tions. For example, a simple suicide clause within the policy could void the
policy completely if the insurer decides to contest validity of the contract
within the contestable period.213 This possible implication is especially
troubling in Montana, which is the only state that has adopted PAS through
the state’s common law.214
A. Montana’s Failure to Codify Physician-Assisted Suicide Legislation
Leaves Consumers Participating in PAS Vulnerable
to the Will of Insurers.
The possibility for insurers to contest validity of the insurance contract
under a suicide clause is especially likely in Montana where PAS has not
been codified.215 In 2009, the Montana Supreme Court held in Baxter v.
State216 that nothing in Montana law prohibits suicide, and thus, physicians
who assist terminally-ill patients in hastening their deaths cannot be prose-
cuted under the state’s deliberate homicide statute.217 Although several bills
have been introduced in the Montana legislature since the holding in Bax-
ter,218 none of these bills have passed.219 The court in Baxter, however,
held that “physician aid in dying provided to terminally ill, mentally com-
petent adult patients” is not contrary to public policy.220 In its rationale, the
court explained that a physician aiding a patient in dying “is not directly
212. Charles Orton-Jones, Is litigation worth the expense and emotional cost? RACONTEUR (May 25,
2016), https://perma.cc/D3Y6-52XH (“Litigation can be unpredictable, the financial cost is uncertain
and . . . complicated issues [can be] timely and costly to explore.”).
213. See supra Part III.C. for a detailed discussion of this possibility.
214. See Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13.
215. Several bills have been initiated in the Montana legislature, none of which have passed. See id.
216. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
217. Id. at 1215 (holding that the consent as a defense, codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211,
protects physicians from a deliberate homicide charge if the physician, with consent from the patient,
assists a patient in hastening the patient’s death). Deliberate homicide is codified at MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-102 (2019).
218. Senate Bill 202 would have modeled Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, outlining requirements
for individuals to participate in PAS. S.B. 202, 64th Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2015). Montana
legislators considered two other Senate bills in 2011 and 2013 that would have legalized PAS. See S.B.
167, 63rd Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011); S.B. 220, 64th Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2013).
House Bill 536 and House Bill 284 would have created a law explicitly criminalizing physician aid in
dying. H.B. 536, 65th Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017); H.B. 284, 66th Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mont. 2019). Because these bills did not pass through the legislature, Baxter v. State is currently the
controlling law in Montana. See Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13.
219. Id.
220. Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1215.
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involved in the final decision or the final act.”221 To support its conclusion,
the court cited the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act,222 which enti-
tles patients to make “autonomous, end-of-life decisions.”223
The Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act contains a section re-
garding the effect of insurance when the patient makes the decision to with-
drawal or withhold medical treatment.224 This section reads:
The making of a declaration pursuant to [Section] 50-9-103 does not affect
the sale, procurement, or issuance of any policy of life insurance or annuity,
nor does it affect, impair, or modify the terms of an existing policy of life
insurance. A policy of life insurance is not legally impaired or invalidated
by the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an in-
sured, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the contrary.225
The Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act does not apply to PAS
because the Act omits PAS in its language.226 Specifically, Section 50-9-
205(1) of the Act applies to “death resulting from the withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment,”227 which is not within the definition of
PAS.228
The statutory language of the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
becomes critical if any of the scenarios noted above were to occur. As the
law in Montana currently stands, PAS lacks any regulation. Among other
public policy concerns, because Montana has not codified regulations for
PAS,229 and because PAS does not fit into the language of the Montana
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act,230 an insurer may deny an insured cover-
age under a life insurance policy should a physician help hasten the in-
sured’s imminent death. Unless the policyholder can assert a defense of
waiver or estoppel, the beneficiaries of the policy will likely be stripped of
the policy’s benefits.231
Failing to pay benefits on policies in which insureds chose to hasten
their own impending deaths is fundamentally inequitable. The purpose of
PAS is to afford terminally-ill individuals the dignity, autonomy, and inde-
pendence to choose their manner of death without the pain and suffering of
221. Id. at 1217 (emphasis in original).
222. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to 50-9-111 (2019).
223. Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1217.
224. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-205 (2019).
225. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-205(2) (2019).
226. Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1219.
227. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-205(a) (2019).
228. When electing PAS, “the doctor assists suicide by offering her medical knowledge, but does not
actively or passively participate in the actual event of death.” Chamberlain, supra note 7, at 65.
229. Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13.
230. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-205(1) (2019).
231. As noted above, should the insurer contest validity of the insurance policy under a suicide
clause in a state that has not codified a PAS statute, and the policyholder’s estate cannot defend on
waiver or estoppel grounds, then the insurer will likely succeed in voiding the contract.
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waiting on the disease to consume them.232 Insureds should not have to
worry about whether their beneficiaries will be adequately compensated if
the insured chooses to participate in PAS. The insured’s main concerns
should be on their palliative care, which is the purpose behind PAS,233 not
whether the insurance companies will contest validity of an insurance con-
tract.
B. If the United States Supreme Court Rules that PAS is a Fundamental
Right, States Should Enact PAS Laws that Require Insurers to
Honor an Insured’s Choice to Participate in
Physician-Assisted Suicide in Order to
Protect Consumers.
Codifying PAS and including explicit statutory provisions requiring
insurers to honor an insured’s choice to participate in PAS will become
even more imperative if the United States Supreme Court rules that the
right to die is fundamental, thus legalizing PAS throughout the states.234
Although the Court has been faced with the question of whether individuals
have a right to PAS on several occasions, it has refused to recognize such
right and has even gone so far as to explicitly reject its existence.235 Fur-
ther, the Court has not heard a case regarding the right to die since 2006 in
Gonzales.236 Although recent debate in California could have led to an ap-
peal to the Court, litigants involved in the constitutional challenges of Cali-
fornia’s End of Life Options Act237 chose not to appeal the California Su-
preme Court’s decision in Ahn v. Becerra.238
232. See generally Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13.
233. Id.
234. Indeed, codifying PAS laws as quickly as possible after any common law ruling is essential to
protect beneficiaries’ rights. As Justice James C. Nelson noted in his concurrence in Baxter v. State,
states may find a fundamental right to bodily autonomy and individual privacy within their state consti-
tutions. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1233 (Nelson, J., concurring) (stating that “physician aid in
dying is firmly protected by Article II, Sections 4 and 10 of the Montana Constitution”). Thus, had the
Montana Supreme Court rooted its holding in the State Constitution, as suggested by Justice Nelson,
legislative attempts to thwart Baxter would be impossible without a constitutional amendment. The same
logic can be applied to any state or federal common law decision that determines PAS is a fundamental
right under an applicable constitution.
235. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274–75 (2006) (holding that, although not creating
a fundamental right to die, the United States Attorney General could not prohibit physicians from pre-
scribing drugs to assist in PAS under the federal Controlled Substance Act); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793 (1997) (ruling that New York statutes do not violate Equal Protection of terminally ill patients);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that the asserted right to assist in another
person’s suicide is not fundamental).
236. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
237. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443–443.22 (2020).
238. See Ahn v. Becerra, Docket No. S253709 (Cal. Jan. 23, 2019).
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In rather dramatic fashion, litigants have challenged California’s End
of Life Options Act239 in the courts since the Act went into effect in
2016.240 In Ahn, the trial court ruled that the Act was unconstitutional,
thereby striking down the opportunity for terminally-ill patients to seek out
PAS in California.241 A California appellate court, however, reversed this
ruling through a writ of mandamus based on lack of standing.242 On Febru-
ary 27, 2019, the California Supreme Court denied review of four issues
raised by plaintiffs.243
Since the ruling in Ahn, two more states have adopted PAS laws.244
New Jersey adopted its Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act on
April 12, 2019, and the law went into effect on August 1, 2019.245 On June
6, 2019, Republican Assembly member, Robert Auth, along with three co-
sponsors, introduced a bill in an attempt to repeal the new law before it
went into effect.246 As of April 4, 2020, H.B. 5525 has been referred to the
Assembly Judiciary Committee but has not yet been passed.247
Additionally, Maine adopted its Death with Dignity Act on June 12,
2019.248 On June 26, 2019, the Christian Civic League of Maine filed a
petition to repeal the Death with Dignity Act, pursuant to a veto ballot initi-
ative.249 The Christian Civic League of Maine failed to procure the required
amount of signatures to put the veto initiative on Maine’s election ballot.250
The challenges to the newly enacted laws in Maine and New Jersey are
not surprising. Indeed, aside from Hawaii and Washington, each time a
state has adopted PAS laws, those in opposition have challenged the laws
through legislative initiative or through litigation.251 Thus, as more states
adopt right-to-die laws, it is extremely likely that the United States Supreme
Court will grant certiorari in lawsuits challenging the new laws. Should the
239. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443–443.22 (2020)
240. See California, supra note 35.
241. Answer to Petition for Review, Ahn v. Becerra, No. S253709 (Cal. Feb. 13, 2019) at 5.
242. Id.
243. Ahn v. Becerra, No. S253709, 2019 CA Lexis 1296 (Cal. Feb. 27, 2019).
244. Maine and New Jersey passed PAS legislation during the 2019 legislative session. See From
First Bill to Final Win, supra note 18. New Jersey’s Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act is
codified at N.J. STAT. §§ 26:16-1 to 26:16-20 (2019). Maine’s Death with Dignity Act is codified at ME.
REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(2)(M) (2019).
245. New Jersey, supra note 35.
246. H.B. 5525, 218th N.J. Leg., 2d. Sess. (N.J. 2019).
247. Repeals “Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act”, NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF LEGIS.
SERVS., https://perma.cc/5XR4-CU3F (last visited July 1, 2020).
248. 2019 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 271 (H.P. 948) (L.D.M 1313) (West).
249. Maine, supra note 59.
250. Id.
251. California, supra note 35; Colorado, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://perma.cc/GQB8-FJYM (last
visited January 31, 2020); District of Columbia, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://perma.cc/2M84-4KHJ
(last visited July 28, 2020); Maine, supra note 59; New Jersey, supra note 35; Oregon, supra note 15;
Vermont, supra note 35.
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United States Supreme Court ever overturn Glucksberg and rule that the
right to die is a fundamental, it is crucial that states explicitly adopt PAS
laws that include provisions explicitly and unambiguously requiring insur-
ers to honor an insured’s decision to participate in PAS, regardless of con-
tractual provisions to the contrary.
To date, Maine has adopted the most comprehensive insurance provi-
sions to protect consumers.252 Subsection 19 of Maine’s Death with Dignity
Act, regarding insurance annuity policies, reads:
The sale, procurement or issuance of any life, health or accident insurance
or annuity policy or the rate charged for any life, health or accident insur-
ance or annuity policy may not be conditioned upon or affected by the mak-
ing or rescinding of a request by a qualified patient for medication that the
patient may self-administer to end the patient’s life in accordance with this
Act. A qualified patient whose life is insured under a life insurance policy
issued under the provisions of Title 24–A, chapter 29 and the beneficiaries
of the policy may not be denied benefits on the basis of self-administration
of medication by the qualified patient in accordance with this Act. The rat-
ing, sale, procurement or issuance of any medical professional liability in-
surance policy delivered or issued for delivery in this State must be in accor-
dance with the provisions of Title 24–A.253
Incorporating the clear, unambiguous language regarding insurance
and annuity policies in Maine’s Death with Dignity Act is imperative for
states adopting future PAS laws. Failure to adopt these provisions could
lead to the prejudicial and inequitable withholding of rightful benefits by
insurance companies in states that have explicitly legalized PAS. Further,
should the Supreme Court find that the right to die is fundamental, thereby
legalizing PAS throughout the country, adoption of these insurance provi-
sions is even more imperative. Failure to adopt explicit, unambiguous lan-
guage in PAS laws, such as the language in Maine’s Death with Dignity
Act, could lead to a nationwide withholding of benefits to beneficiaries of
insureds who choose to participate in PAS,254 similar to the pitfall in Mon-
tana’s failure to adopt a statute regulating PAS.
252. ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(19) (2019).
253. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 22 § 2140(19) (2019).
254. This potential nationwide withholding of benefits would not apply to jurisdictions that have
codified PAS because their statutes explicitly require insurers honor an insured’s decision to participate
in PAS. These jurisdictions include California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, New
Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See Take Action in Your State, supra note 3.
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V. RECOMMENDATION TO AMEND EXISTING STATUTES THAT ADDRESS
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
AND INSURANCE
Although nine jurisdictions have currently codified PAS laws, only
Maine explicitly addresses whether the terms of a life insurance policy are
voided when they conflict with the PAS statute’s language.255 The statutes
at issue simply state that “[a] qualified patient’s act of ingesting medication
to end his or her life . . . [shall not] have an effect upon life . . . insur-
ance.”256 This broad-sweeping language begs the question—what consti-
tutes an “effect” upon life insurance? As such, existing PAS statutes should
be amended to tighten the requirement that insurers honor policyholder’s
insurance policies in the event the insured participates in PAS, regardless of
the terms of the contract. In particular, legislatures in jurisdictions with ex-
isting PAS laws, and those jurisdictions adopting these laws in the future,
should include the language from Maine’s Death with Dignity Act.257 Spe-
cifically, states with existing PAS laws and states adopting PAS laws in the
future should include the following provision:
A qualified patient whose life is insured under a life insurance policy issued
under the provisions of [title of the Act being adopted] and the beneficiaries
of the policy may not be denied benefits on the basis of self-administration
of medication by the qualified patient in accordance with this Act.258
By adopting this language, jurisdictions with PAS laws would further
protect individuals from unfair and discriminatory treatment by their insur-
ers by requiring the insurers to pay rightful benefits to named beneficiaries
under life insurance policies of insureds who participate in PAS, regardless
of policy language to the contrary.
VI. CONCLUSION
An individual’s right to privacy and bodily autonomy has been ex-
panding for the past half-century of American jurisprudence.259 Although
255. As discussed in Part IV.B. supra, Maine is the only state that has adopted statutory language
that explicitly and unambiguously requires insurers to provide benefits to beneficiaries of insurance
policies in which the insured participates in PAS.
256. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.875 (2020).
257. ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(19) (2019).
258. ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(19) (2019).
259. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (holding that individuals of
the same sex have a constitution right to marry one another); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973)
(ruling women have a constitutional right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends the right to contracep-
tion to non-married individuals); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (holding that individuals
have a constitutional right to marry each other, regardless of race); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut statute banning the sale of contraceptives).
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the Supreme Court has yet to rule that an individual has a fundamental right
to PAS, jurisdictions have been adopting PAS laws since Oregon codified
its Death with Dignity Act in 1997.260 Each of these jurisdictions’ laws
include specific language requiring insurers to honors insurance policies on
an insured if the insured chooses to participate in PAS.261 Aside from
Maine, these statutes fail to address whether the terms of the policy, specifi-
cally exclusions and suicide clauses, are negated when the insured partici-
pates in PAS. Because of the potential pitfalls in the broad language of
existing PAS statutes, legislatures in jurisdictions with these existing laws
should amend their laws to include explicit language indicating that a policy
involving an insured who was unaware of the terminal disease at the time of
purchasing life insurance and who participates in PAS is not effected by the
insured’s participation in PAS, regardless of any policy provisions to the
contrary. This paper suggests that existing and future PAS laws should
adopt the language from Maine’s PAS laws regarding insurance and annui-
ties policies.
Further, states that have failed to adopt PAS laws leave their constitu-
ents in a vulnerable position if the they choose to participate in PAS. Be-
cause no regulations exist regarding PAS, and thus no regulations exist re-
garding insurance in the context of PAS, constituents in these jurisdictions
may fall prey to voidance of life insurance policies by the insurer. Three
situations can be outlined in the case of an insured participating in PAS in a
state that does not regulate the practice: (1) the policyholder knew of the
terminal illness before applying for life insurance and disclosed this infor-
mation to the insurer; (2) the policyholder knew of the terminal illness
before applying for life insurance and failed to disclose this information to
the insurer; and (3) the policyholder did not know about the terminal illness
prior to applying for life insurance, and thus, could not disclose the infor-
mation to the insurer.
To protect policyholders in these scenarios, courts must examine these
issues from the perspective of the insurers and policyholders. In particular,
courts must analyze a myriad of defenses and counter-defenses, including
concealment, misrepresentation, waiver, and estoppel, and apply these de-
fenses to the particular facts of the case to determine whether the insurance
policy should apply as written. This process is costly, unpredictable, and
260. See Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13. See also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800 et seq. (2020).
Since the passage of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, eight other jurisdictions have adopted PAS laws.
Death with Dignity Acts, supra note 13; these jurisdictions are California, Colorado, District of Colum-
bia, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, Vermont, and Washington.
261. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-115 (2020); D.C.
CODE § 7-661.009 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-17 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 2140(19) (2019);
N.J. STAT. § 26:16-14 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.875 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5287 (2020);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.170 (2020).
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time-consuming.262 For this reason, to protect their constituents from preju-
dicial treatment, it is imperative that states adopting PAS laws include stat-
utory language that explicitly requires insurers to honor insurance policies
in which an insured participates in PAS, regardless of the individual policy
provisions.
262. Orton-Jones, supra note 213.
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